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Leading journalists and academics from both sides of the Atlantic review 
Obama’s presidency and legacy and look ahead to Trump’s term in the 
most powerful office in the world.
OBAMA THE PROGRESSIVE 
Elizabeth Anderson is professor of philosophy and women’s 
studies at the University of Michigan.
Obama has been the best US president by far in my lifetime – 
which includes the tail end of Eisenhower’s term. Our outgoing 
president has advanced the most consequential progressive 
domestic policy agenda since Lyndon B Johnson. 
Allow me to list some of Obama’s biggest accomplishments. 
He achieved the closest thing to universal healthcare the US has 
seen, in the face of massive political opposition – the top agenda 
item for progressives since Truman. His stimulus bill ensured a more 
rapid recovery from the great recession than that experienced by 
peer countries in the EU, which have pursued counterproductive 
austerity policies. He rescued millions of good jobs by supplying 
loans to the vehicle industry, preventing its collapse in the financial 
crisis. He oversaw a major banking reform, which reduces the chance 
that banks will cause future financial crises and provides consumer 
protections from deceptive financial practices. He strengthened 
women’s rights to equal pay for equal work. He raised the minimum 
wage for employees of government contractors. He ended banks’ 
usurious involvement in federal student loans, dramatically reducing 
the costs to students of borrowing for college. He made the federal 
tax system substantially more progressive. 
Obama’s Department of Justice has vigorously advanced minority 
voting rights and has taken major initiatives to reduce racist policing 
and incarceration practices. His supreme court appointees ensured 
that gay and lesbian couples have the right to marry. He has banned 
federal contractors from discriminating against LGBT employees. 
He suspended the deportation of undocumented immigrants who 
entered the US as children. His energy and environmental policies 
have reduced the country’s greenhouse gas emissions and committed 
it to dramatic reductions in the future.
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I could list hundreds more progressive achievements. And unlike LBJ, 
Obama has nothing comparable to the catastrophic Vietnam war 
to mar this legacy. (Afghanistan may be a quagmire, but the scale of 
the problem is much smaller than in Vietnam.) Unfortunately, although 
I think his reputation will only grow over time, the election threatens 
to dismantle many of his achievements, as it hands total control of 
the federal government to the Republicans. Republicans in congress 
are likely to find this more difficult to achieve than they anticipate, 
however, and they will court disaster if they go too far. 
The election result means the path to cementing Obama’s legacy is 
now longer and rockier than it might have been, but I am hopeful that 
ultimately consolidation will be achieved.
A LEGACY HIGHJACKED
Jedediah Purdy is Robinson O. Everett professor of 
law at Duke University, North Carolina. His most recent 
book is After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene 
(2015, Harvard University Press).
Barack Obama’s eight-year presidency changed utterly on 8 November 
2016, when Donald Trump narrowly defeated Hillary Clinton in the 
contest to become his successor as President of the United States. 
The ironies are cruel. Trump is an anti-Obama. The country’s first 
black president, scion of a middle-class, mixed-race, globe-spanning 
family, will hand the White House to an America-first plutocrat whose 
campaign created a new version of white identity politics. Obama is 
deeply intelligent, reflective and deliberate, to the point of sometimes 
seeming hesitant or inhibited in public – a president who is all super-
ego. Trump is a Republican id: impulsive and unapologetic offence are 
what you might call his leadership style. The Obama administration 
has been singularly ethical, going eight years under an opposition 
microscope with no plausible scandal. Trump has already made clear 
that he will be redefining presidential ethics as he spends the next four 
years building his global brand. At the end of Barack Obama’s second 
term, with his approval ratings still over 50 per cent – he could almost 
certainly have beaten Trump, had he been constitutionally allowed to 
seek a third term – the defining thing about his presidency is that it 
ended with Trump’s victory.
It isn’t only the question of the White House, which the Democrats 
have recently considered their strong suit in national politics. Obama 
leaves his party as weak as it has been for a century, without control 
of either house, in danger of losing supreme court seats now held 
by elderly justices, and devastated in state governments, where 
Republicans have swept elections for the last decade. Yet it is hard 
to find a bad word for him, hard not to feel that he is the best of 
America, and that the country failed itself in falling from his political 
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maturity and chastened hopefulness into a nativist tantrum and 
incipient kleptocracy.
A PRESIDENTIAL BREATH OF FRESH AIR 
AND FAIRNESS
I voted and volunteered for Barack Obama in both his presidential 
races. In 2008, I was one of the canvassers who spent days in 
South Carolina, where he won a dramatic victory in the presidential 
primaries after losing New Hampshire. In his candidacy, I saw 
something new in my lifetime: a way to speak of solidarity and fairness 
as youthful, vital and, maybe above all, American principles. The 
proof was not just in Obama’s unique eloquence, which seemed 
an unheralded music after 16 years of Bill Clinton’s sentimental 
sideshow-barking and George W Bush’s silverback grunts, but in 
the tide of political energy that moved around him. We volunteers – 
many of us young (then), but many others old enough to remember 
Robert F Kennedy before he was assassinated in 1968 – felt we 
had rediscovered the basic power of democratic citizens: to remake 
the architecture of our collective lives through peaceful, purposeful 
mobilisation.
It wasn’t just a dream. Obama beat Hillary Clinton, whose nomination 
was just as anointed, and meant to be just as inevitable, in 2008 as 
in 2016. Then this black man, who shared his middle name (Hussein) 
with the ousted dictator of Iraq and whose last name was one letter 
away from ‘Osama’ (bin Laden), defeated John McCain, a decorated 
veteran, legitimate war hero and actually principled Republican. 
Obama won North Carolina, Virginia (which had not voted Democrat 
since 1976), and Indiana, which had been Republican since 1964. 
2008: truly a year of wonders.
DEMOCRAT REJECTION?
And now, here we are. But what has this catastrophe to do with 
Obama, other than the fact that it will inevitably define the memory of 
his presidency? There is a vast amount of contingency in Trump’s win. 
Hillary Clinton finished ahead by 2 million votes nationally, meaning 
she would have won in any normal democracy; only the arcane 
and indefensible electoral college, an artifact of the constitutional 
compromise of 1789, handed the presidency to Trump. In hindsight, the 
Clinton campaign made disastrous decisions: to all but ignore the upper 
midwest, where Trump won the contest; to concentrate on Trump’s 
temperamental failings and offensiveness to liberal sensibilities, rather 
than his right-wing economics (evident in the campaign despite populist 
noises) and long history of mistreating and stiffing workers and small 
businesses. In other words, in a thoroughly populist year, the Clinton 
camp ran a non-populist campaign against a gifted demagogue. For all 
that, Trump barely won.
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But there was more than poor campaign choices. Throughout the 
2016 campaign, political energy was concentrated in movements 
and candidates that squarely rejected the premises of Barack Obama’s 
politics. These premises were two: the first more evident in his 
campaigning and touchstone speeches, the second in his governing. 
First was a redemptive American constitutionalism, a recurrent 
insistence that the arc of American history really does bend towards 
justice, if only Americans work to make good on their own principles: 
liberty and equality foremost. This is the language of Abraham Lincoln 
and Martin Luther King, and Obama spoke it better than anyone in his 
generation. It was, really, the nerve of his 2008 campaign, the refrain of 
his oratory, and the Sistine ceiling of his political imagination.
There is not a hint of this in Donald Trump’s campaign. His America 
has nothing to do with the arc of justice. Its historical memory runs 
back as far as some ill-specified time when the country was ‘great’, 
forward to the next promised ‘win’. But Trump is hardly alone. 
Bernie Sanders’s ‘democratic socialist’ populist campaign had no 
time for Obama’s high-mindedness. Sanders spoke the language 
of class conflict and ‘political revolution’, solidarity and struggle. 
Outside the presidential campaign, the most vital political movement 
in the US today, Black Lives Matter, is in many ways a direct rejection 
of Obama’s redemptive constitutionalism. Its focus has been on the 
ways white America has resisted redemption, on the continuities 
that link slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and the economic inequality, 
mass incarceration, and racially disparate police violence of today. 
From street demonstrations to its most influential text, Ta-Nehisi 
Coates’s Between the World and Me (2015), this movement confronts 
American history as a broken thing that continues to break black 
bodies, and seeks to challenge it from outside, not within its own 
constitutional logic and rhetoric. Even Hillary Clinton, Obama’s 
designated successor, lacks the music of his redemptive language 
and set it aside.
Obama’s other strut, and the heart of his governing, was technocracy. 
He consistently deferred to established experts in economics, 
finance, the military and so forth. By and large, he also stuck to 
the deep technocratic assumption that there is a rough-and-ready 
‘public interest’ that good government can achieve if it is only 
allowed to work efficiently and rationally. This has been the 
hallmark of American liberalism and progressivism (as we call our 
government-friendly centre-left tradition) for more than a century. 
It is to be contrasted with a focus on distributional politics.
It is obvious that the Sanders campaign put economic distribution 
alongside democratic renewal at the heart of its programme. It was the 
clearest response in 2016 to the new political awareness of inequality 
that followed the appearance of Thomas Piketty’s Capitalism in the 
Twenty-First Century (2013), and, more importantly, to the lived 
experience of many Americans, of all ages but especially the young 
– experiences of economic uncertainty, anxiety, and stagnation. But 
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Trump’s campaign is also intensely distributional, albeit in a centre-right, 
nationalist register: wealth and jobs for Americans, not the Chinese; 
public benefits for American retirees (we shall see how long that lasts), 
not for refugees or immigrants; tax breaks for those who understand 
themselves as deserving. This distributional politics has actually been at 
the heart of Republican campaigns for decades, and was crystallised 
in Mitt Romney’s notorious remark that 47 per cent of Americans were 
on the take and had no interest in responsible government or fiscal 
discipline. But it was Trump’s focus on the un-American undeserving that 
made it especially explicit and central. Here, too, Obama stands on a 
political island, the waters having washed away the ground around him.
In all of these respects, it may be that the cruel and defining last twist 
in Barack Obama’s presidency is not personal, not even specifically 
American, but a symptom of world history. Something is afoot at 
the end of 2016 that was hardly hinted at in 2008: a pattern of 
nationalism, populism and political anger. Frequently, as in Trumpism 
and the Brexit campaign, it seems to combine intense democratic 
self-assertion with scepticism verging on nihilism about the capacity 
of existing states to do any real governing at all. Obama ran as a 
more optimistic sort of populist in 2008, but in hindsight he seems 
to have regarded that demotic triumph more as a qualifying exam 
than as his calling. His surprising diffidence about movement politics, 
his impulse to cool emotions rather than raise them, and his respect 
for institutions make him not just the anti-Trump, but Mr Anti-2016. 
And yet. After all that, to repeat, he could probably have won a 
third term. Barack Obama, the insurgent of 2008, has come to stand 
for the idea that the system works, or can be made to work with 
enough effort. Many many Americans want to believe that, enough 
that they would have been glad to let him continue standing for it a 
while longer.
FROM CAMPAIGN ERRORS TO A STRENGTHENING 
OF THE LEFT
That does not make Obama an innocent bystander in the present 
catastrophe. He called into being the first, and one of the most 
hopeful, of the populist waves of the last decade, then turned his 
back on it once it had delivered him to power. He shared his party 
establishment’s disdain for the Bernie Sanders movement when 
Sanders nearly repeated Obama’s 2008 trick of beating an anointed 
Clinton, and generally failed to discern the lack of enthusiasm 
for Clinton or to save her self-defeatingly conventional campaign. 
If the Barack Obama of 2008 had meant everything he said, and felt 
it as his followers did, he might have had some sense that not all was 
as the pollsters and demographers assured him. On a deeper level, 
Obama did not show much inclination to fight his way out of 
the neoliberal, hawkish model of government that he inherited: 
from Obamacare to Afghanistan, he has rather tried to administer 
it in a more rational and humane fashion. Donald Trump will amplify 
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the worst of that model while discarding the best of Obama’s work 
within it, but he also managed, mostly on attitude alone, to profit from 
voters’ frustration with it. Rising Obamacare premiums, frustration 
with available healthcare plans, and endless, pointless wars helped 
Trump, even though he will make all of these problems worse.
An unintended consequence of Obama’s presidency has been 
the rise of a stronger American left than has been seen in nearly 
50 years. There was something in the mere election of a liberal 
that created breathing room for radical impulses that, since 2001, 
had been concentrated on constitutionalist resistance to executive 
overreach and lawless war. In 2011, after three years of mostly patient 
post-crash suffering, Occupy Wall Street sprang up alongside the 
encampment movements of Madrid, London, Tel Aviv and elsewhere. 
The occupiers’ slogan ‘We are the 99 per cent’ presented a curious 
kind of permission to commentators great and small to begin talking 
without apology about economic inequality – which had been growing 
for almost 40 years, mostly unacknowledged beyond the gadfly left. 
Around 2011, a small surge in radical ideas began, including the 
appearance of the pugnacious socialist-Marxian magazine Jacobin 
and smaller fellow travellers. There was new interest on campuses 
in political economy and radical ideas.
Then came the Sanders campaign, appealing to working-class 
and lower-income voters, young people and the highly educated, 
and, despite its notoriously weak performance among older African 
American voters, decisive majorities of young voters of colour. 
It was the year’s best chance to turn the wave of populist energy 
in an anti-racist, solidaristic and genuinely egalitarian direction. 
A missed opportunity for now, it may not be done yet. It will not be 
Barack Obama’s forces that save his legacy, if it is saved at all.
HOPE HANGOVER 
Samuel Moyn is professor of law and history at 
Harvard University.
Barack Obama has been the best president of my lifetime. 
The trouble is, that isn’t saying much. If his time in office bears a 
lesson for the future, it is the need to move towards what we might 
call ‘realistic idealism’.
Obama’s calm could not compensate for the gridlock to which he 
deferred and the injustice he had to tolerate. And that is because 
the sort of idealism he represented has already reached its limits 
and begun to be replaced.
On the night he was first elected, Obama explained that his victory 
was ‘not the change we seek. It [was] only the chance to make that 
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rhetorical mobilisation, he put too much stock in supposedly post-
political expertise. Outside of election time and mourning for national 
tragedies, Obama rarely tried to connect to his voters, squandering 
the hope he famously elicited, except for an occasional rhetorical high 
that weakened each time. 
A couple of years ago, I guessed that Obama’s primary legacy would 
be his destruction of political idealism. Given that the Bernie Sanders 
candidacy took the country by storm soon after, it was a premature 
claim, to say the least. Even though he was bitterly criticised as a 
dreamy idealist himself, Sanders actually showed a different tendency 
at work.
The tide of hope for Obama in 2008 was different from the swell 
of enthusiasm for Sanders in 2016. The former was far larger and 
it worked like a daydream: it provided a lovely escape. By contrast, 
Sanders’s idealism took the form of a partisan jeremiad. Sanders 
did not imply a quick fix or suggest that everyone really agreed if 
only politicians would stop misleading them. Imperfectly but better 
than any other candidate, Sanders addressed the core concerns 
of Black Lives Matter, without forgetting the undereducated 
white Americans whose class agony has misled so many into 
supporting Donald Trump and scapegoating other victims rather 
than participating in a transracial majority that would advance 
their interests.
Sanders’s remedies were also a kind of realistic idealism. The solutions 
called not for easy unification of the American people but, in the spirit 
of Franklin Roosevelt, forcing the rich into a collective venture in the 
society they currently rule from on high and as if from outside. This kind 
of idealism is riskier. It calls for more, not less, division, refusing to offer 
false rhetorical healing. It does not promise to overcome difference with 
words but to undo it with policy.
People will differ over whether or not they want a realistic idealism. 
Some people prefer the purity of abstract promise, whether for their 
lives in this world or the next. But Obama’s true significance is that 
he has taught many of his followers to rethink what sort of hope they 
want. It can be beautiful but diversionary and evanescent, or it can 
be divisive and uncertain but real.
Now that Donald Trump has been elected president, a frightened 
sense of threat has understandably crept in. Having entered by 
inviting hope, Obama is leaving by symbolising normality. Fear of 
the state, not debate about how to turn the state to help ordinary 
people, predominates. And fair enough: the risks under Trump and 
his associates are plain. But there is also a great risk that, in the 
confusion, a necessary debate about the future of our idealism gets 
lost as the sense of emergency thrusts itself into the foreground. 
If we revert to a hard-bitten realism about the bare fundamentals of 
a free society to rally around in the storm, not only will we fail to be 
ready when it passes, but we will have no vision to offer those who 
have thrown in their lot with the charlatan.
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OBAMA AND THE POTENTIAL, 
AND LIMITS, OF LIBERALISM 
Richard Yeselson is a contributing editor to 
Dissent magazine.
A horrifying orange meteorite seems likely to eviscerate Barack 
Obama’s policy legacy. The election of Donald Trump, and, just as 
importantly, the unified control of the American government by a hyper 
extremist and partisan Republican party, means that Obama’s major 
policies – and indeed a good deal of the already truncated US welfare 
state that predates him – could well be extinguished. More important 
for the future of the planet, Obama’s efforts to slow down climate 
change are also likely to be ignored at best (the Paris agreement) 
or simply reversed (presidential initiatives to regulate carbon emissions 
in the US).
Whether all of this happens or not depends on the byzantine workings 
of congress and whether the, um, mercurial Trump actually cares 
to ratify its decisions. Those decisions will likely include some effort 
to repeal, or at least gravely damage, Obamacare, the president’s 
incremental, flawed but nevertheless significant effort to reform the 
American healthcare system, one that has provided insurance to 
20 million Americans. Republicans are also looking forward to gutting 
the Dodd–Frank Act and other efforts to regulate banks and Wall 
Street, as well as the consumer financial protection bureau, a project 
driven by the liberal left senator Elizabeth Warren, whom the executive 
class despises. Trump’s circle of plutocratic buddies should find all of 
these changes to be excellent ideas indeed. It is true that Eisenhower 
did not roll back FDR’s New Deal; neither did Churchill roll back 
Atlee’s NHS. But, even though today’s Republicans claim to admire 
both those men, they don’t make conservatives like Ike any more in 
the US.
Trump’s appointment of Jeff Sessions, an extremist remnant of the 
pre-civil rights Jim Crow South, as the nation’s attorney general will 
gut the justice department’s civil rights enforcement. This includes 
support for African American and Latino voting rights, which 
Republican state governments around the country have sought to 
impede by making it more difficult for those without voter IDs or time 
off on election day to vote. This might have an increasing impact on 
the Democratic party’s ability to win office at the state and national 
level for years to come. Regardless of its political impact, in a nation 
in which African Americans have died for the right to vote, it is 
morally despicable.
Even easier for Trump to reverse will be Obama’s executive orders, 
issued as a last resort because of the Republican obstruction to 
his legislative agenda, which we Americans attribute to ‘divided 
government’. Government is now divided no more and the 
Republicans will, effectively, come close to running a parliamentary 
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programme. Thus, for example, Trump can, owing to a law a 
Republican congress passed at the beginning of George W Bush’s 
administration, simply delete several of these executive orders that 
would raise the wages and improve the working conditions of millions 
of workers who are employed by companies that do business with 
the federal government. Trump’s purported populism – which he also 
displays by fighting a union-organising drive at his Las Vegas property 
– does not quite include raises for underpaid Americans during a time 
of great income inequality.
Again, all of this hangs in the balance. It is possible that the 
Republicans will botch the logistics of gestating their libertarian 
obsessions or that Trump will double-cross the speaker of the 
house, Paul Ryan, the genial anti-redistributionist fanatic with whom 
he has had a tense interaction. It is already clear that, even on 
his own authoritarian terms, Trump has no idea what he is doing. 
But the Republicans are implacable and, in that Trump is ignorant 
and indifferent about almost every element of public policy, he is as 
much likely to give them what they want as not. 
Assuming that much of this happens, Obama’s policy legacy will 
– astonishingly given the obvious historic nature of his presidency – 
amount to very little. So what will Barack Obama leave behind? 
Three important things, I think. First, Obama constantly appealed to 
his fellow citizens that the country must redeem the promise of the 
universalist aspirations of its founding credo, ‘All men are created 
equal’, duly revised to account for subsequent African American 
and feminist struggles for that same equality. His speech at the 
50th anniversary of the civil rights march at Selma, Alabama in March 
2015, in the face of a racist assault by police, powerfully embodies 
his understanding of the great sweep of American history. This story 
is a kind of cosmopolitan civic nationalism, a counter-narrative to 
the ethno and racial nationalism of the Trumpists and much of the 
Republican party. It will be drawn upon again and again to inspire 
and mobilise many over the years to come.
Second, this story of the continued struggle for social justice 
and national perfectibility has given many young, non-white 
and working-class leftists a bit of space to generate their own 
movements. Black Lives Matter, the ‘Fight for $15 [per hour wages]’, 
Occupy Wall Street and, of course, the Sanders campaign 
(even as Obama himself supported his more mainstream colleague 
Hillary Clinton) have all emerged during the Obama years. So as 
with FDR during the 1930s and JFK at the start of the 1960s, 
Obama has been a democratic president – a breed often cautious 
to propose reform – who has enabled more militant expressions 
of political change to emerge. Liberals aren’t leftists, but nor are 
they conservatives who tend to actively repress the left – there is 
synergy between liberals and leftists, which its warring antagonists 
don’t always appreciate. These movements will be challenged by 
Trump’s belligerence, but most of them have already caught hold and 
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are ready to continue to fight. Their efforts have already moved the 
Democratic party to the left on matters of economic redistribution 
(Clinton herself was a very different politician from her husband), 
and this will be important in appealing to a working class of whites 
and non-whites alike in the future.
Finally, Obama’s post-partisan language – assumed to be in bad 
faith by the right and mocked as weak by the left – actually served 
to expose the revanchist hysteria that courses through much of the 
Republican party. (There are some principled conservative writers 
and intellectuals trying to resist this tendency but, so far, well… note 
who is the president-elect.) To name just a few central examples: the 
sheer hysteria about a modest healthcare bill – frequently labelled 
‘the death of freedom’ by GOP politicians; the insane efforts to 
label Obama un-American (led by Trump!) and a dangerous Muslim; 
and, as important, the procedural radicalism of the congressional 
Republicans, engineered by the party’s top strategist, senate leader 
Mitch McConnell (shutting down the government, insisting on a 
supermajority requirement for every bill, denying Obama the right to 
fill the supreme court vacancy caused by the death of Justice Scalia, 
and much else).
On the one hand, the Democratic party is at its weakest position since 
1928. It will have to figure out what it stands for and how to regain 
power when certain structural conditions under the US constitution tilt 
in favour of the Republicans. On the other, for four years Obama tried 
to work with the Republicans in good faith, but probably naively, before 
eventually concluding that he was, in fact, naive. Now the Republicans 
control the entirety of the government and will move the courts in their 
direction too. The paradoxical effect of Obama’s proffered hand being 
spurned will be that as he leaves office more popular than ever, the 
American people may see that in choosing Trump as his replacement 
they have reaped the whirlwind. Donald Trump is a unique monster, 
but he was spawned in a Republican laboratory. 
OBAMA AND HEALTHCARE
Elizabeth Bruenig is an assistant editor at the Washington 
Post, and has contributed to other publications on ethics, 
politics, culture and Christianity.
With the 2016 election already consigned to memory, some Americans 
have already begun to regard President Obama – not yet out of 
office – with a sense of nostalgia. It’s not difficult to see why. Obama 
will leave the White House with higher approval ratings than ever 
(CCN/ORC poll), while the incoming president will take his place with 
fewer popular votes than any winner in over 100 years and record high 
unfavourable ratings (Gallup poll). The clarity of hindsight also casts the 
uncertainty attached to Trump’s nascent administration in a fearsome 
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light: it’s obvious to us now that Obama led the nation through a trying 
but peaceful eight years, but it’s difficult to even guess what Trump will 
mean for the future. 
One of Trump’s principle promises while running for president was that 
he would undo Obamacare, the unofficial title of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, a federal statute Obama enacted in 2010 
and spent the remainder of his presidency defending. It has been 
fought in states and courts and hotly contested within conservative 
media, and has been dubbed a Trojan horse for socialism by 
Republican lawmakers. Obamacare may well have helped win Trump 
the election.
Some 81 per cent of Trump voters were unhappy with Obamacare 
(ABC figures), and of voters displeased with the Act, 80 per cent broke 
for Trump (NBC figures). In late October, the Obama administration 
announced that premiums for mid-level plans could rise some 
25 per cent in 2017, and while much of the cost spike would be 
absorbed by subsidies, that’s cold comfort to those already distressed 
over the tax burden of an often unwieldy and complex programme. 
Indeed, at the end of Obama’s term, millions are still uninsured in 
states without expanded Medicaid coverage (the state and federal 
programme that provides health coverage for those on a very low 
income), others have been left clinging to ‘bronze plans’ with absurdly 
high deductibles that leave families functionally uninsured, and in 
some districts so many insurance companies have pulled out of the 
exchanges that there is no choice left to citizens. With Republicans 
taking control of the White House and both houses of congress, it’s 
hard to imagine that a brighter future for Obamacare lies on the horizon.
Some of the programme’s misfortunes are political: Conservatives 
fought Obamacare and made it difficult for Democrats to enact all 
the provisions they had planned. But others are structural, and were 
built into it from its inception. It was always aimed at sealing gaps in 
the employment-based American healthcare regime, and though its 
supporters promised it would provide an ‘off-ramp’ to that system, 
the exit never arrived. This meant that rather than vastly improving 
lives and thus building an automatic constituency of support to sway 
politicians towards keeping the plan in place, Obamacare vexed millions 
and provided conservatives with a glaring vulnerability to exploit. 
Ultimately, though, centrist Democrats happy with Obamacare’s 
limited approach to solving problems with the pre-existing system 
may not be the biggest political losers in the coming years. 
Though they face the destruction of Obama’s namesake programme – 
and with it, much of his legacy – the programme’s demise may prove 
even more damaging for the left. While some American politicians 
have rallied for a Medicaid-for-all system that would institute a single-
payer programme in the United States, this leftward proposition failed 
in the 2016 Democratic primaries, in part because many Democrats 
insisted that it would entail scrapping Obamacare. Rather than 
momentum-building for a single-payer system, it’s safe to presume 
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Democrats will be doing little more than defending the remnants of 
Obamacare for the foreseeable future. And the association between 
Obamacare’s snags and what Fox News and others have dubbed 
‘socialised medicine’ will very likely doom agitation by the left for a 
more expansive programme for years to come. Prospects for a push 
towards a single-payer system would have been very dim under a 
Clinton administration, and under a Trump administration they are 
essentially non-existent. 
Of course, there will be many hurt by rolling back Obamacare, 
though it isn’t yet clear which parts Trump will set his sights on 
and which he will spare. Those who lose coverage will be in a much 
more distressing position than those whose political hopes have been 
frustrated by the way the programme unfolded. But as Obama moves 
on to the next phase in his life, the Obamacare portion of his legacy 
appears to hold little promise: the right detests it, the centre concedes 
that there is much about it that needs repair (repair that now appears 
unlikely to happen), and the left has little reason to hope it may give 
way to a more progressive American healthcare system. If it goes 
down in history as a success, it will only be because what comes next 
may be bad enough to inflict amnesia about how we got here. 
OBAMA, LIVING STANDARDS 
AND THE FUTURE
Lane Kenworthy is professor of sociology and 
Yankelovich chair in social thought at the University 
of California, San Diego. His most recent books 
are How Big Should Our Government Be? (Bakija 
et al, University of California Press, 2016) and Social 
Democratic America (OUP USA, 2014).
The chief reason Donald Trump received so many votes in the US 
presidential election is that most Americans are firmly attached 
to their preferred political party and each party has the support 
of roughly half of the electorate. Most Republicans will vote 
for the Republican candidate no matter how objectionable he 
or she may be, which guarantees that candidate about half of 
the votes. A secondary reason is that a significant number of 
white Americans without a four-year college degree – ‘working-
class’ whites – seem to have wanted a president committed to 
changing the country’s economic and/or social direction. Trump 
won this group by a margin of almost 40 percentage points. 
That’s a stunning number and a significant increase from the 
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What exactly do these working-class white Americans think has gone 
wrong? Some possibilities:
• Frustration at perceived economic decline. In 2014, white persons 
aged 25–54 without a college degree were twice as likely as 
African Americans to say their standard of living was much worse 
or somewhat worse than their parents’.
• Frustration at lack of economic improvement. Wages have been 
stagnant for the lower half of American earners since the late 
1970s. For men without a college degree they have decreased. 
Household incomes have increased, but not much, and since 
2000 they too have been stagnant.
• Worry due to economic insecurity – fear of losing a job and not 
finding a comparable replacement, fear of losing one’s home to 
foreclosure, fear of poverty in retirement.
• Frustration at the high cost of childcare, health insurance, 
housing in an area that’s safe and has a good state (‘public’) 
school and college.
• Resentment at growing economic inequality. Those with a college 
degree have been doing fine, the rich even more so.
• Resentment at groups who receive particular types of government 
help, from social assistance to healthcare to disability benefits to 
‘affirmative action’ (positive discrimination).
• Frustration at loss of status. This is especially pertinent for 
working-class men, whose identity used to be centred on having 
a stable, solid-paying, full-time job in a ‘male occupation’.
• Frustration at neighbourhood and small-town urban decay – 
fewer good jobs; less attendance at religious services; schools 
and infrastructure decaying due to revenue decline, which spurs 
population decline, which furthers the revenue decline; more 
people misusing drugs such as meth, opioids and heroin. This is 
in sharp contrast to the big cities – even some that were in bad 
shape a few decades ago, like New York and Pittsburg – which 
seem to be doing very well, with growing populations, declining 
crime, plentiful restaurants, well-kept parks and new housing.
• Discomfort with social and cultural modernity – the embrace 
of racial and ethnic diversity, openness to non-traditional 
family structures and sexual orientations, political correctness, 
and the ascendance of secularism.
• Resentment at being viewed as ignorant, simple-minded, 
backward, blindly religious, intolerant, ‘deplorable’ by economic, 
cultural, media and governmental elites.
• Distrust of politicians who argue for staying the course. 
They must be in the pockets of the rich and powerful or the 
well organised. Perhaps they are lining their own pockets.
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The Obama administration worked hard to improve the economic 
wellbeing of ordinary Americans and it achieved some notable 
successes, among them: helping to prevent a 1930s-level economic 
collapse (the 2009 stimulus) and strengthening regulations on the 
financial sector to reduce the risk of future financial crises (the Dodd–
Frank Act), passing a healthcare reform that increased the share of 
Americans with health insurance from 85 to 91 per cent and slowed 
the growth of health costs (the 2010 Affordable Care Act), investing 
in infrastructure (stimulus), expanding the earned income tax credit 
(stimulus), appointing a federal reserve chair (Janet Yellen) committed 
to pursuing not just low inflation but also maximum employment.
In the presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders 
offered additional proposals: affordable early education, paid parental 
leave, paid sickness leave, reduced cost of college, more investment 
in infrastructure, rule changes to make it easier to form and sustain 
labour unions, a higher federal minimum wage, a tax incentive for 
firms to adopt profit sharing.
All of these would be helpful. But they are not, alone or in combination, 
likely to bring back the lifetime job with a middle-class salary that 
at least some, perhaps many, of the non-college-educated white 
Americans in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin yearn for.
To speak to that yearning, Sanders and Clinton, like Barack Obama in 
2008, argued for a tougher approach to trade policy, suggesting that 
American workers could get back some of the manufacturing jobs 
that have moved to China, Mexico and other lower-wage countries 
in recent decades. But Obama wasn’t really committed to restricting 
trade, and neither was Clinton. Whether Donald Trump genuinely 
favours doing so is anyone’s guess, but he made the case with gusto, 
so voters may have been more likely to believe him.
What should be the progressive strategy for working-class 
Americans in small and medium-sized towns and cities that have lost 
manufacturing jobs? Some elements, like education, (re)training and 
infrastructure investment, are uncontroversial. But let me highlight 
three that, while a tougher sell for political candidates, I hope 
progressives will be increasingly willing to confront.
First, we should embrace trade with low-wage nations. It benefits us 
as consumers and it boosts the living standards of people in those 
countries who are much poorer than we are. Progressives want 
the world’s less fortunate to have not only freedom and democracy 
but also economic prosperity, and manufacturing jobs are very 
helpful in this pursuit. In any event, manufacturing employment has 
been shrinking steadily in all rich nations since the 1970s. As with 
agricultural jobs in earlier decades, this is due as much to automation 
as to globalisation. When transport costs increased a few years ago 
because of higher oil prices, some manufacturers moved production 
from China back to the United States, but often to factories operated 
largely by robots.
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Second, using public resources judiciously means resisting the 
temptation to spend to the hilt in order to keep a dying town afloat. 
Sometimes the best course of action will be for people to move 
elsewhere, to where the jobs are, even though that means leaving 
friends, neighbours and community.
Third, one of the best strategies for revitalising a declining area 
is to attract population inflow. Here a particularly likely source is 
immigrants. The case for immigration rests not just on appreciation 
of diversity and concern for the least well-off: it’s also based on 
narrow self-interest.
OBAMA AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Joss Garman is the political director of the Syria Campaign, 
and a former director at Greenpeace UK and the Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR). He advised Lisa Nandy MP 
in her role as shadow energy and climate change secretary.
Accepting his nomination to be the Democratic presidential candidate 
on 3 June 2008 Barack Obama told the crowds, ‘This was the 
moment when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet 
began to heal’. But was it? 
NASA reports that 2016 is on course to be the hottest year on record, 
and the last few months have seen Arctic sea ice levels at lows 
unprecedented for this time of year (data from the National Snow and 
Ice Data Center). Yet for the first time since the start of the industrial 
revolution the output of global carbon pollution has stalled, investment 
in clean energy is at an all-time high, emissions from the US are 
at their lowest level for two decades, and in the Paris agreement 
the world has its first ever legally binding global deal to address 
climate change, with commitments from all of the biggest economies 
including China. 
President Obama can probably take more credit for this progress than 
anybody else, but it wasn’t always clear that this would be his legacy. 
His strategy for delivering pollution cuts inside the US seemed to falter 
in his first term in office after the complete failure, in the face of an 
intransigent congress, of his administration to introduce his proposed 
European-style carbon trading scheme. Against the backdrop of the 
global financial crisis, this defeat sucked hope out of COP15, the UN 
climate change talks held in Copenhagen in 2009, and cast extreme 
doubt that the world would ever manage to agree to any global action 
at all. An international agreement was left looking near impossible 
when the Chinese and other major emerging economies simply 
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Through an approach of delivering a credible domestic action plan, 
together with intensive diplomacy by Secretary Kerry, a deal was 
finally struck between the two largest polluters in the world, which 
broke the deadlock that had dogged the negotiations for 20 years. 
This was instrumental in enabling the Paris summit, COP21, to be 
a success. Ahead of the historic conference in December 2015, 
Obama told one visitor to the Oval office: ‘I’m dragging the world 
behind me to Paris’. 
And so he did. The US–China deal, struck just months before 
COP21, saw a commitment from Beijing to build an additional 
800–1,000 gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero-emission 
generation capacity over the next 15 years – more than the capacity 
of all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to 
the total current electricity generation capacity of the United States. 
The evidence of the seriousness of that Chinese plan can now be 
seen from the changing facts on the ground already being witnessed. 
The country’s coal use has likely peaked already (according to 
analysis by leading economists including Lord Nicholas Stern), 
and China is now investing more than any other in clean energy 
technologies: more than US$100 billion in 2015 alone. 
While mounting pressure from the residents of smog-filled Chinese 
cities and the increasing quality and affordability of renewable 
technologies were also key factors in securing this progress, the scale 
of China’s commitment can be seen as a monument to the success of 
President Obama’s diplomatic efforts, which in turn were dependent 
upon the changes he was eventually able to drive through at home 
through his personal leadership.
In a hugely symbolic move in the weeks ahead of the Paris summit, 
Obama vetoed the proposed Keystone pipeline, which would 
have carried the dirtiest oil on Earth from the tar sands of Canada 
into the United States for refining and export to global markets. 
This followed major national protests, and a warning from NASA 
director Professor James Hansen that its construction could mean 
‘game over’ for the climate. 
But more consequential in emissions terms were Obama’s successful 
doubling of vehicle fuel efficiency standards and the reforms to the 
rules governing the US power sector. In a landmark supreme court 
ruling Obama won acknowledgment that carbon dioxide is a pollutant 
requiring regulatory action by the Environmental Protection Agency in 
order to protect public health. This ruling formed the basis of his new 
clean power plan, which allowed him to use executive action to bypass 
congress and to require that every state needed to develop a preferred 
strategy for lowering emissions output in their area to specified levels. 
Together with tens of billions of dollars in public investment in clean 
energy that Obama injected through his stimulus package, this locked 
the US coal industry into the death spiral that was taking place anyway 
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era, one-third of the US coal fleet was retired, and half is expected to 
have closed by the end of 2017.
This remarkable shift in energy investment, under way right across 
the United States, means that even if president-elect Trump does 
away with Obama’s clean power plan, as he has said he will, 
the US may still meet the country’s Paris agreement commitments. 
One analysis suggested the US’s targets could be met 15 years early, 
such is the pace of the changing reality (by Julie Kashen for Politico 
Magazine). As Secretary Kerry told the COP22 UN climate summit in 
Marrakech in November 2016, ‘Market-based forces are taking hold 
all over the world… None of us pretended that in Paris the agreement 
itself was going to achieve two degrees. What we knew is we were 
sending that critical message to the marketplace, and businesses 
have responded.’
With just days left in office, Obama still seems focused on what 
environmental protections he can lock down before Trump’s 
inauguration. In late November he announced that he was putting 
huge areas of the sensitive Arctic Ocean off limits from oil and gas 
exploration (as part of a new five-year plan under the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management). This further boosts his achievement of being 
the US president to have protected more acreage of public land and 
water from industrial development than any other in history.
The scale of the environmental damage to be inflicted by a Trump 
administration swamped with fossil fuel lobbyists remains unclear, 
but as Obama said of the international climate effort in an interview 
with the New York Times in May 2014, ‘It’s not going to happen as 
fast or as smoothly or as elegantly as we like, but, if we are persistent, 
we will make progress.’ 
OBAMA’S RHETORIC
Alan Finlayson is professor of political and social theory 
at the University of East Anglia.
‘If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place 
where all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our 
founders is alive in our time, who still questions the power of our 
democracy, tonight is your answer.’ 
Barack Obama, presidential victory speech, 4 November 2008
‘Working together, we will begin the urgent task of rebuilding our nation 
and renewing the American dream. I’ve spent my entire life and business 
looking at the untapped potential in projects and in people all over the 
world. That is now what I want to do for our country.’ 
Donald J Trump, presidential victory speech, 9 November 2016
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To persuade people in matters of politics and public affairs – 
to inspire and move them to action – one must first have a grasp of 
the peculiarities of the particular humans to whom one is speaking. 
Rhetoric is not primarily about turns of phrase and rhythmic repetition. 
It is about making use of ‘common opinion’ – things most people 
believe to be true. It connects a proposition (to support a bill, 
raise taxes, start a war) to sentiments, values and understandings 
already shared by the audience. It shows that some new plan or 
idea is similar or connected to something with which we are already 
familiar, making it thinkable in some specific way. In so doing, rhetoric 
makes manifest some part of the culture and character of a people, 
applying it to the problems of the present, testing its mettle. 
When the novel proposition is a candidate, then the candidate 
has, in some way, to connect themselves to something the 
audience already knows and thinks and to something in its 
character. Only then can that candidacy become thinkable and 
meaningful. As the sociologist Jeffrey Alexander puts it in his 
(recommended) account of Obama’s rise, The Performance of 
Politics (OUP, 2011), one of the things that politics is made of is a 
public stage upon which political actors (in all senses of that word) 
‘project performances of their reasons’. They embody a claim about 
human affairs – some set of shared beliefs, feelings, moods and 
meanings – and act as protagonists in our social drama. They are 
‘exemplifications of sacred religious and secular texts’. At elections, 
rival candidates perform different propositions. They activate and 
amplify different kinds of belief and participate in a societal dispute 
about which parts of our collective character we should cultivate 
and express. 
At such performances Barack Obama was a master. In his 2004 
address to the Democratic party convention Obama announced his 
presence on the stage as ‘pretty unlikely’ before speaking of his father 
– ‘he grew up herding goats, went to school in a tin-roof school’, and 
his mother, the Kansas-born daughter of an oil rigger and soldier. He 
evoked the old American story of social mobility, expanding it into a 
newer story of cultures meeting and melding. Obama’s grandparents 
had a dream that they worked hard to realise; his parents had 
dreams they too worked hard to fulfil, and now Obama on stage in 
front of fellow Democrats was the fulfilment of that dream, even as 
he dreamed of the future for his own children. ‘I stand here today, 
grateful for the diversity of my heritage, aware that my parents’ 
dreams live on in my precious daughters. I stand here knowing that 
my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt to all of 
those who came before me, and that, in no other country on Earth is 
my story even possible’: the American exception and the dreams that 
it is made on, materialised before the audience in the body and words 
of Barack Obama. 
By 2007, Obama’s ‘unlikely presence’ had turned into an ‘improbable 
quest’ for the nomination. In 2008, after a better than expected loss 
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in New Hampshire, it was ‘our improbable journey’. Listing and so 
integrating his diverse supporters into one unified campaign, Obama 
made the ‘impossible odds’ they faced equivalent to those overcome 
by ‘generations of Americans’ – slaves and abolitionists, immigrants 
and pioneers, organised workers and suffragettes, Kennedy and King. 
The pairings unite, the list makes time into one movement (the ‘arc of 
the moral universe’, which ‘bends towards justice’) at the culmination 
of which is the Obama campaign itself: ‘Yes. We can.’ 
The highest achievement of this art was his March 2008 speech 
‘A More Perfect Union’, delivered as senator. Here, on the backfoot 
over the politics of race, Obama modified his story so that it 
embodied not just the promise of America but the trauma too – 
the ‘stain’, the ‘original sin of slavery’. Now the improbable thing is 
the American experiment in democracy itself – an experiment still 
under way and which, though fraught, could succeed in the form of 
this improbable campaign. Significantly, that speech ended with the 
story of ‘a 23-year-old white woman named Ashley Baia’, working 
for the campaign organising an African American community. At an 
organisers’ meeting, Obama told us, an elderly black man explained 
that he was there not for healthcare, the economy, education, the war 
or Obama himself but ‘because of Ashley’. In ‘that single moment of 
recognition between that young white girl and that old black man’, 
Obama implied, we glimpsed the perfection of the Union that his 
campaign promised. And so, in his victory speech in 2008, electoral 
success was proof of the living dream, the realisation of the founders’ 
vision, the instantiation of democracy itself. Who, indeed, could doubt it? 
Watching Trump’s victory speech eight years later we should be struck 
at first by how similar it is to Obama’s. It lacks the fluency, of course, 
but it too celebrates a movement that has culminated in victory and 
that builds its promise around the American Dream: a promise that 
Trump managed (improbably) to embody more successfully than his 
opponent. But it is not the same dream. In a precise way, Trump’s 
performance is the opposite of Obama’s. Where Obama sought to 
embody the potential success of the American dream, Trump embodied 
recognition of its loss. His campaign organised itself around the idea 
that the dream required not fulfilment but rescue – not making the US 
great but making it great again. 
In the quote that forms an epigraph to this essay, Trump announces a 
common project to rebuild and renew. The implication – the common 
opinion shared by his audience – is that the US has gone wrong, is 
broken, its potential untapped. Trump’s campaign was dedicated in ways 
often unnoticed to speaking of sorrow and of loss – of jobs, security and 
dignity; of children killed in badly fought wars against dictators abroad 
and drugs at home. But having evoked such experiences, common to 
many in the audience, the rhetoric turned to allocation of blame: China, 
NATO, establishment politicians, ‘crooked’ Hillary. 
The rhetorical performance of Trump is the dark dialectical antithesis 
of Obama’s. Obama represented himself as a fulfilment of the 
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American dream; Trump’s political career began as an attempt to 
prove that Obama was not American at all. Obama’s story was 
self-proclaimed as ‘unlikely, ‘improbable’ – and Trump claimed it 
was literally so. Where Obama made himself, and remained, so very 
presidential, Trump – with all the bluster and offence – become the 
epitome of the un-presidential, in a performance that was thus an 
implicit critique of the aloofness of the office itself. Obama’s was a 
promise of racial unity. Trump reverses the meaning of that concept 
so that it stands for radical racial division, immigrants and others 
taking the country for themselves. 
At a more fundamental level Obama used his personal story as the 
script for the performance of an ‘exemplar’: one who stands out as 
indicative rather than exceptional. He dissolved his uniqueness into 
the uniqueness of the country as a whole, which was then reflected 
back at an audience which recognised itself, its own promise, its own 
dream, its own historical mission. The Trump script was about the 
exceptional – the huge, the amazing, the most – not the exemplary. 
He performs himself, the businessman, the one who sees untapped 
potential, the one who stands out and stands apart from the 
mainstream. He is the one whose words do not belong to the office 
of president because his words are his own, just as his money is his 
own and he is his own man. 
But – and this is very important – Trump did not project his image 
of himself directly at his audience. They were not invited to be 
supplicants to his greatness. His rhetoric does not simply tell his 
audience how great and wonderful they are but magnifies their sense 
of themselves as exceptions to the rule in the contemporary US 
and performs the projection of that being-excepted outwards at the 
others who are to blame. Audiences can vicariously enjoy Trump’s 
aggression towards others, his mockery and his abuse. ‘Hope is a 
joy not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past 
about the issue of which we sometimes doubt’ wrote Spinoza. 
Obama’s rhetoric, for its audience, inspired just such a joy in the 
face of uncertainty. ‘Hatred’, wrote Spinoza, ‘is sorrow with the 
accompanying idea of an external cause’. Anger is the desire to injure 
those we hate and ‘Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving 
the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we 
hate.’ Hate, anger and derision – these are the emotional coordinates 
Trump’s performance enables his sorrowful audience to experience. 
Rhetoric succeeds by connecting new propositions to something 
an audience already believes. But political actors, movements and 
speechwriters choose which audiences they speak to and which 
of the many things a people believes should be appealed to. They 
choose which parts of our character to perform and promote. It is 
possible to win by appealing to particular constituencies, directing 
their sorrow at outsiders and giving them the feeling of power 
that comes with anger and derision. But it is also possible (or so 
progressives must believe) to seek to appeal to – what Obama in 
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his last state of the union address called – ‘our better selves’. Or, to 
our ‘grace’, as he referred to in his eulogy to Clementa Pinckney, 
the Democrat state senator killed in the 2015 mass shooting at a 
Charleston church: 
‘…an open heart. That, more than any particular policy or analysis, is 
what’s called upon right now, I think – what a friend of mine, the writer 
Marilyn Robinson, calls “that reservoir of goodness, beyond, and of 
another kind, that we are able to do each other in the ordinary cause of 
things”. That reservoir of goodness. If we can find that grace, anything is 
possible. If we can tap that grace, everything can change. Amazing grace. 
Amazing grace.’
OBAMA’S COMMUNICATION LEGACY
Julia Azari is associate professor and assistant chair 
of the department of political science at Marquette 
University. She is the author of Delivering the People’s 
Message: The Changing Politics of the Presidential 
Mandate (Cornell University Press, 2014).
As we plan for an unexpected and unprecedented presidential 
transition here in the United States, we should also contemplate the 
legacy that President Barack Obama has left behind. His presidency 
was historic and extraordinary in some ways, ordinary in others. But 
one area in which Obama’s innovations will have lasting impact is in 
his approach to communication. 
Presidential communication is an essential facet of the office: it informs 
national leadership and shapes the ideology of the party the president 
leads. These possibilities are especially critical to understanding the 
impact of Obama’s communication legacy for presidential politics, and 
for anticipating the presidential politics to come. 
Obama’s communication legacy has been innovative in several ways. 
He built on a legacy from past presidents of adapting contemporary 
forms in order to democratise the presidency. As presidential power 
has increased and the way that citizens understand that power has 
become, on balance, more sceptical and more polarised, presidents 
have endeavoured to soften their images in a number of ways. They 
have used visual rhetoric, appearing in casual attire. They have used 
humour, addressed audiences directly and intimately, and told stories 
about their own backgrounds or those of others. 
Obama took each of these methods to new levels. His appearance 
with Zach Galifianakis on the actor’s online mock talk-show Between 
Two Ferns showed the president trading barbs with a dour and quirky 
comedian. His interaction with comedian Marc Maron (in June 2015) 
allowed him to contemplate at length the larger questions of American 
democracy and racial history. 
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It is perhaps in the area of race that Obama’s communication legacy will 
be most fraught and unwieldy. Several scholars have noted that Obama 
invoked ‘respectability politics’ in his early rhetoric about the African 
American community, drawing on frameworks offered by figures like 
Bill Cosby, who insisted that black culture and behaviour were partially 
responsible for the community’s disadvantaged status (for example, 
see The Race Whisperer by Melanye T Price, NYU Press, 2016, and 
The Price of the Ticket by Fredrick C Harris, OUP, 2012). By virtue of 
being part of that community, Obama could criticise it in ways that 
would have been off-limits for a white Democratic politician. Obama, 
as both candidate and president, was also able to talk about race in 
personal terms, invoking his experience with members of his multi-
racial family and uttering the famous line, ‘If I had a son, he’d look like 
Trayvon Martin’ (the 17-year-old African American fatally shot in Florida 
by a neighbourhood watch volunteer in 2012).
Mixing his style of casual, democratised ‘real talk’ with observations 
on race has left a puzzling roadmap for any white successor. Writing in 
September 2016, I predicted that the politics of the Obama years had 
left Hillary Clinton with a racially divided polity and a limited rhetorical 
script. This is not, of course, the situation that has come to pass. 
Instead, the 2016 election has resulted in president-elect Trump. 
Like Obama, the president-elect has viewed his charge as one to talk 
about race in plain and authentic terms. But it is safe to conclude for 
now that Trump speaks to a very different audience. His descriptions 
of US cities have none of Obama’s grasp of history or nuance. 
It is likely that president-elect Trump is about to learn several lessons 
about communication that Obama also learned upon taking office. 
First, setting the bar high for authenticity is a double-edged sword. 
Promising honesty and transparency to voters – even implying it – 
establishes expectations about openness. These expectations do not 
stop at the boundaries of the formal office: they extend to personal 
and financial dealings. The race implications are especially dire here: 
some of the president-elect’s supporters have promoted the notion 
that he will ‘make America white again’. These are not, needless to 
say, normal expectations for a modern politician about to take the 
highest office in the land. Trump may soon discover that railing against 
political correctness is easier to do as a candidate than as president 
of the entire nation. Whatever he does with that discovery will exact 
political costs. 
Second, just as Obama discovered that norms about presidential 
discourse serve a purpose, Trump will as well. You cannot call 
people stupid when you have access to the nuclear codes; it’s not 
an interaction between equals once you have taken office. Not all 
American citizens will find Trump’s language distasteful – the election 
showed that. But the tides may shift when he takes office. 
Obama’s rhetoric as a candidate also succeeded because he 
offered a positive vision of the US alongside his critiques of the Bush 
administration. The speech that launched his career as a national 
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politician, at the 2004 Democratic national committee, envisioned 
not a red-and-blue America, but a United States of America, where 
lives were complicated and values were shared. Trump’s America, 
as described in his speeches, is a bleak and violent one. He talks 
about restoring past greatness, a message that is clear enough to 
his listeners even without the more explicit racial rhetoric. Obama’s 
state of the union address in January 2015 revealed how strained 
his original vision has been, including passages like ‘we may have 
different takes on events in Ferguson and New York. But surely we 
can understand a father who fears his son can’t walk home without 
being harassed. Surely we can understand the wife who won’t rest 
until the police officer she married walks through the front door at the 
end of his shift.’ For a presidential candidate from the opposition party 
it’s relatively straightforward to offer compelling criticism. Articulating a 
positive vision is more challenging. 
Furthermore, when Trump is not inciting anger, he is talking about 
infrastructure and other basic matters of governance. If rhetoric is, 
in fact, the glue that holds his party together, governance will soon 
prove a different and more formidable challenge. Republicans enjoy 
congressional majorities but major fissures in the party remain. 
Bringing the house freedom caucus on board with an infrastructure 
agenda may prove difficult, for example. American political parties 
are much more powerful as abstract ideas that shape loyalties than 
as organisations that shape governance decisions. Rhetoric is a key 
vector of those ideas. But this leaves presidents with little leverage at 
key moments. 
US presidential politics is defined by a dynamic legacy of how 
presidents define and justify their power and make themselves seem 
at turns ordinary and dignified, intimately tied to the people and 
removed from them. The presidency also features pendulum swings 
between parties and visions for the nation. Obama’s main legacy for 
his successor may be that a robust vision takes more than rhetoric 
to sustain. 
AND NOW… PRESIDENT TRUMP
Timothy Shenk is a Mellon postdoctoral fellow at Washington 
University in St Louis, Carnegie fellow at the New America 
thinktank, and book editor at Dissent magazine.
Donald Trump is not really a businessman. He is more like television’s 
version of a businessman. Although he depicts himself as a captain 
of industry, his greatest skill is brand management. That’s why 
he was the perfect choice to decide actor Gary Busey’s fate on 
The Celebrity Apprentice. Trump’s knack for self-promotion served 
him well in the presidential campaign. It will prove less useful in 
the White House, where managing the ungainly apparatus of the 
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executive branch and stitching together majorities on Capitol Hill 
take priority. Nobody can predict how Trump will respond to these 
challenges. But historical experience and his own words suggest that 
his administration is likely to proceed along one of three routes.
He could try to be like Ronald Reagan. This would be the easiest 
path for Trump to follow because it is the one for which congressional 
Republicans have been clearing the way since 2009. With the 
White House and congress in their hands, Republicans are ready 
to push through an agenda that rivals the New Deal in its scope. 
Repealing Obamacare and privatising Medicare (the federal 
programme that provides non-means-tested health coverage for 
people aged 65 and over or have a severe disability), tax cuts whose 
benefits would flow overwhelmingly to the rich, massive reductions in 
non-defence discretionary spending and sweeping deregulation are all 
on the agenda. Twenty-first century Reaganism would add some new 
twists – torpedoing the Paris climate agreement, for example – but the 
contours of this programme would be recognisable to the Gipper. 
Or he could try to be like Richard Nixon. Although Nixon today is 
remembered for the abuses of power that forced his resignation, 
two years before he left office he won reelection by one of the largest 
margins in American history. He owed his success to his ability to 
coopt popular Democratic policies while representing himself as 
the champion of a silent majority that had been overshadowed by 
unruly forces on the streets and in the universities. Twenty years later, 
Nixon’s former aide Pat Buchanan resurrected his old boss’s rightwing 
populism in his own run for the White House; today, Buchanan proudly 
describes Trump as his heir. This is the Trump who called his campaign 
an opportunity to ‘declare independence from the elites who’ve 
led us to one financial and foreign policy disaster after another’. 
An administration guided by this strategy would be willing – even 
eager – to flout Republican orthodoxy. Trump’s chief strategist Steve 
Bannon has already predicted the fallout. ‘The conservatives are going 
to go crazy,’ he told an interviewer shortly after the election. ‘It will 
be as exciting as the 1930s, greater than the Reagan revolution – 
conservatives, plus populists, in an economic nationalist movement.’ 
Or he could try, simply, to be like Donald Trump. During the campaign, 
Trump mixed authoritarian impulses with an emphasis on the need 
for independent citizen-politicians, a blend that vaguely recalls 
Andrew Jackson but has had no recent precedents in the White 
House. This is the Donald Trump who has called for a temporary ban 
on Muslims entering the United States, supports ending birthright 
citizenship, sows doubt about the reliability of elections when he 
thinks he’s going to lose, admires Vladimir Putin’s ‘strong’ leadership, 
wants a deportation force targeting millions of undocumented 
immigrants, incites violence against protesters at his rallies, 
endorses changing libel laws to make it easier to seek retribution for 
unfavourable coverage, and threatens to jail his opponents. But this 
is also the Donald Trump who listed term limits as the lead item in 
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the plan for his first 100 days in office, vowed to ‘drain the swamp’ in 
Washington, and knows that telling his supporters he can never be 
bought is one of his best applause lines. 
In practice, Trump is likely to combine all three approaches, just as 
Nixon and Reagan did before him. Both Nixon and Reagan had their 
own forays with executive overreach – Watergate brought down 
Nixon, Iran-Contra could have done the same for Reagan – and both 
knew when to act the part of ideologue and when to cut a deal. 
The balance Trump strikes among these strategies will determine 
the major battles of the years ahead. Candidate Trump, for example, 
followed the Nixon path and pledged to leave Medicare and social 
security untouched. Nobody knows what he will do when Paul Ryan 
pushes him to revisit those subjects from a more Reaganesque 
perspective. Congressional Republicans might check Trump’s 
authoritarian and populist instincts – or they might hide in their offices 
and play dead. After a year that has defied every political convention, 
anyone who claims to know for sure what happens next is lying. 
Cutting across all of this is the more basic issue of competence. 
According to the New York Times, in the spring of 2015 Donald Trump Jr 
offered Ohio governor John Kasich the vice-presidential nomination 
on behalf of his father, promising that Kasich ‘would be in charge of 
domestic and foreign policy’ while the president occupied himself 
with ‘making America great again’. Even if Trump wants to use the 
presidency to do more than funnel clients to the Trump Organisation, it is 
not clear if he will be competent enough to do the job. That will become 
especially important when – and it’s a matter of when not if – he’s 
confronted with an emergency that forces him to make decisions that 
will have global ramifications. 
Americans have elected a man who made a career out of playing 
television’s version of a businessman. Now we’re going to discover 
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